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Abstract
Football is a low-scoring sport in which a few single moments can change the
result of an entire match, regardless of what else happened during the 90 minutes on
the field. Thus, random forces can have a substantial influence on match outcomes.
However, decision makers in European football clubs often rely heavily on recent
match outcomes when evaluating team performance, which can lead to systematic
misjudgments. In this paper, we propose a complementary approach for performance
evaluation aimed at enabling decision makers to substantially mitigate the tendency
to overlook the influence of randomness in match outcomes. We build upon the
concept of expected goals based on quantified scoring chances and develop a chart
that visualizes situations in which a team’s true performance throughout a sequence
of matches likely deviates from the performance indicated by match outcomes. The
insights provided by the chart can systematically alert decision makers of professional
football clubs about sensitive situations and should prevent clubs from making flawed
decisions when match outcomes are overly biased due to the influence of random
forces.
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1 Introduction
European football clubs operate in multi-division league systems on the national level with
promotion and relegation between divisions at the end of each season and with opportu-
nities to compete in additional cup competitions. In each season, due to the expectations
of owners, fans and the media, as well as for financial reasons, clubs are under pressure
to achieve certain seasonal targets, such as winning the league title, gaining promotion,
avoiding relegation, progressing in cup competitions or qualifying for a European-level
competition for the following season. In this environment, the decision makers for the
clubs (e.g., owners and directors) often act with a short-term perspective.
Furthermore, the perspectives of clubs are not only characterized by short-termism
but also by a strong outcome focus. This characteristic is perfectly illustrated by former
English captain Rio Ferdinand: “It’s as simple as that (...) the table never lies, the table
is a true marker of where you are supposed to be in the football league” (Henry, 2017,
para. 3). Week in, week out, in football leagues across Europe, decisions worth many
millions of Euros are based on the logic that match outcomes are intrinsically tied to true
performance on the pitch.
However, match outcomes in football are disproportionately influenced by randomness
because football is a low-scoring game in which winning and losing is often determined
by a single goal. Thus, match results occasionally fail to reflect the true level of play
of the two teams on the pitch. Therefore, it is questionable whether match outcomes
truly represent a consistent performance indicator, particularly when considering a limited
match window inside the scope of a single season. Rather, it must be assumed that
systematic misjudgment occurs if outcome-based performance evaluation is applied in
situations in which random forces are significant drivers of the results of recent sporting
events.
Indeed, the fact that important outcomes are shaped by random forces is difficult to
accept because people mistakenly perceive patterns in random sequences (e.g., Henderson,
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Raynor, & Ahmed, 2012; Taleb, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, psycho-
logical research suggests that the acceptance of random forces as a driver of outcomes
becomes even more difficult if the desired outcome is known ex ante, if people take actions
for themselves, and if a situation is focused on success (Thompson, 1999). In football,
these factors are all highly relevant to match outcomes. Therefore, the decision makers of
clubs are likely to exhibit an outcome bias, where they underestimate the role of random-
ness in match outcomes and assign too much weight to the observed outcomes in their
performance evaluation (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Gauriot & Page, 2017). As a result,
decision makers fail to make needed adjustments after fortuitous wins and act excessively
after unlucky losses (Lefgren, Platt, & Price, 2015).1
In this paper, we propose a method for the decision makers of professional football
clubs to substantially mitigate the tendency to overlook the influence of randomness in
match outcomes. To do so, we draw on the idea of expected goals based on quantified
scoring chances, which is assessed by public blogs (e.g., Caley, 2015) and professional
sports data companies (e.g., OptaPro, 2017a; Prozone Sports, 2015) but in only a few
academic papers.2 The core idea of expected goals based on quantified scoring chances
is to give more weight to the actual production process on the pitch instead of relying
solely on the scoreline. This approach has several appealing elements. First, scoring
chances occur much more often than goals and therefore are less prone to the influence
of randomness inherent in single moments of the game. Second,the approach accounts
for the fact that different types of scoring chances, for example, a shot taken 5 meters
away from the goal versus a shot taken 30 meters away from the goal, are associated
with very different probabilities of producing a goal. Third, this approach is football-
intuitive. To create as many good chances as possible and to minimize such chances for
the opposing team is integral in any reasonable game plan in football. Thus, the concept
1 This logic also applies if the decision makers base their decisions on the difference between expected match outcomes
(e.g., derived from the winning probabilities implied by betting odds) and actual match outcomes because the latter are
still subject to randomness.
2 An early introduction of how to quantify scoring chances goes back to the work of Richard Pollard and his colleagues
(Pollard & Reep, 1997; Pollard, Ensum, & Taylor, 2004). More recent work includes Lucey, Bialkowski, Monfort, Carr,
and Matthews (2015) and Eggels, van Elk, and Pechenizkiy (2016).
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of expected goals based on quantified scoring chances applies to any given playing style
and is comprehensible by anyone involved in football.
We use 170,688 shots from all 7,304 matches played in the English Premier League, the
French Ligue 1, the German Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A, and the Spanish La Liga in
the four seasons from 2013/2014 to 2016/2017 to measure scoring chances and estimate the
scoring probability of each shot, which represents the value of a scoring chance. Thereby,
we account for the location of the shot on the pitch, the rule setting (i.e., open play, free
kick and penalty kick), and the part of the body used. The individual scoring probabilities
of multiple shots are then summed over one or multiple matches to derive a cumulative
chance value, which is generally referred to as expected goals (e.g., OptaPro, 2017b; Caley,
2015). For example, if a team had three shots in a match, one within the six-yard-box
with an estimated scoring probability of 0.40, one from around the penalty spot with an
estimated scoring probability of 0.10, and one from far away of the goal with an estimated
scoring probability of 0.01, the team has generated chances worth 0.51 expected goals.3
To obtain an evaluation measure of performance at the team-level based on quantified
scoring chances, we calculate the difference between expected goals created and expected
goals allowed by the team across different match samples, ranging from single matches
to all the matches in a full season. This measure is football-intuitive because it simply
reflects the cumulative value of all the chances created and allowed by a team at a given
point in the season. Moreover, the measure should exhibit less random variation than do
the plain match results because it depends less on the few moments that led to actual goals
scored and conceded but instead considers a much larger part of the team’s production
on the pitch.
Indeed, we show that the recent difference between the expected goals created and
allowed by a team predicts sporting results in the future better than do the past match
3 The most natural interpretation of 0.51 expected goals is that if the same match with exactly the same shots was played
over and over again, the team would be expected to score 0.51 goals on average. Importantly, this figure reflects the three
shots that actually have been taken by the team in that match. Thus, there are real goal chances behind expected goal
values and not just expectations.
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outcomes of a team. Specifically, we compare the goodness-of-fit measure R2 from a uni-
variate linear regression of the future number of points won on the number of points won
from past matches to the R2 resulting from the regression of the future number of points
won on the difference between expected goals created and allowed from past matches. For
any combination of the number of previous matches and the number of following matches
within the horizon of a full season, the R2 obtained by including the difference between
expected goals created and allowed in the regression is higher than the R2 obtained by
including the number of points won in the regression. A comparison of the R2 values indi-
cates that expected goals generally contain more information of true performance on the
pitch than do match outcomes. Thus, the measure appears to successfully filter out some
of the random components that potentially blur match outcomes as a performance evalua-
tion measure. Furthermore, we show that at the individual club level, an overperformance
or underperformance of expected goals in terms of actual goals (i.e., match outcomes) is
often unsustainable and not due to the qualities of a team that are not captured in our
model.
To enable the informational advantage of expected goals to be used to improve the
decision making of a club in an as simple way as possible, we construct a chart that
visualizes situations where randomness is likely to play a large role in match outcomes.4
We plot teams’ rankings in the official league table during a certain matchweek against
their rankings based on the difference between the expected goals created and allowed by
the team. If a team is far below the identity line, i.e., the rank in the league table is
much lower than the rank based on expected goals, it is suspected that the team is under-
rewarded in the league table due to a sequence of overly negative results. By contrast,
if a team is far above the identity line, it is suspected that the team is over-rewarded in
the league table due to a sequence of overly positive results. In both situations, decision
4 Of course, such a chart represents only one example of a visualization that can be customized based on the individual
preferences and requirements of a particular club.
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makers are well-advised to be cautious when drawing conclusions based on a team’s rank
in the official league table.
Situations in which there are large differences between the two table ranks are those
that are most likely to yield decisions based on misjudgments. Thus, we investigate several
cases in which large discrepancies between the ranking in the official league table and the
ranking based on expected goals arguably led to flawed decision making. For example,
the Spanish club Real Betis dismissed Pepe Mel after matchweek 15 of the 2013/2014
season when they were placed last in the official league table but ranked a satisfactory 8th
place based on expected goals. Despite replacing the coach, Real Betis was relegated to
the 2nd division at the end of the season. Manuel Dominquez Platas, who was a director
of Real Betis at the time of Pepe Mel’s dismissal, admitted that it had probably been a
mistake to sack him and that they focused too much on the unsatisfying match results:
“In retrospect, we should have thought about it [his dismissal] a little bit more, but we
were last placed for some weeks already.” (Lepkowski, 2014, para. 6).
Our paper makes three important contributions. First, we introduce the concept of
expected goals based on quantified scoring chances both theoretically and empirically into
the sports economics literature and show that such a metric reflects the true performance
of teams on the pitch more accurately than do match results. Second, we develop a simple
rank comparison chart that alerts decision makers of situations in which random events
may have played a crucial role in the club’s sporting results. The chart can be easily
implemented and understood by decision makers to develop a more reliable picture of a
team’s true performance on the pitch. Third, we support a new mindset for performance
evaluation and decision making of football clubs. Namely, decision makers can complement
their existing outcome-based evaluation strategies with more process-oriented and data-
driven evaluation strategies. This new mindset can be applied to a wide range of decisions
that must be made by professional football clubs, for example, those regarding squad
management or the recruitment of coaches.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we develop a
theoretical framework of expected goals based on quantified scoring chances. In Section
3, we estimate an expected goal model, and in Section 4, we compare the performance
evaluation measures. In Section 5, we address the overperformance and underperformance
of expected goals. In Section 6, we focus on the identification of discrepancies between
expected goals and match outcomes to improve decision making. In Section 7, we conclude.
2 Expected goals framework
In the production process of football, goals, which ultimately determine who will win and
who will lose, are preceded by scoring chances. Thus, the last step in the production
process before scoring a goal is to create scoring chances. The concept of expected goals
draws on these moments of a football match.
To derive expected goals as a sum of quantified scoring chances, one first must define
how scoring chances are identified. The most common approach is to use shots as proxies
for scoring chances because shots are direct attempts to score goals and are relatively
easy to identify (e.g., Pollard & Reep, 1997; Caley, 2015).5 Independent of whether a
shot translates into a goal, each shot exhibits a certain scoring probability based on its
given circumstances. In this section, we develop and discuss eight general factors that are
expected to influence the probability of a shot translating into a goal. These factors are
listed in Table 1.
The first and probably most obvious factor is the location of the shot on the pitch.
Intuitively, a long-range shot from 30 meters must have a low scoring probability because
the goalkeeper has sufficient time to react. By contrast, a central shot from 5 meters
should exhibit a high scoring probability. Thus, the closer a shot is to the goal and the
better the angle of the shot is, all else being equal, the higher the scoring probability is.
5 One alternative proxy for scoring chances is the use of ball possession in certain areas of the pitch (Gurpinar-Morgan,
2015). Another alternative is to capture goal-threatening moments, even if the end result is not a shot, and to exclude
certain useless shots under defined circumstances (Stratabet, 2017).
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Table 1
Factors influencing the scoring probability of a shot.
Location on the pitch
That is:
– Distance
– Angle
Rule setting
That is:
– Open play
– Free kick
– Penalty kick
Body part
That is:
– Foot
– Header
– Other body parts
Defensive pressure
That is (e.g.):
– Position of defenders
– Position of goalkeeper
– Body contact
Motion sequence
That is (e.g.):
– Out of the air
– Out off a dribble
– First touch
Player finishing skills
That is:
– Motor skills
– Mental abilities
Goalkeeper skills
That is:
– Motor skills
– Mental abilities
Other
That is (e.g.):
– Pitch conditions
– Spin of the ball
– Wind influence
Accurate data on shot locations is readily available and shot location has been used in
almost all studies that model scoring probabilities (e.g., Pollard et al., 2004; Rathke, 2017;
Caley, 2015).
A second factor that influences the scoring probability of a shot is its rule setting,
i.e., whether the shot is taken in open play, from a free kick or from a penalty kick. For
example, a shot taken in an open-play situation, where the ball is typically in motion, is
different than a shot taken from a free kick, where the ball is at rest and opposing players
are required to maintain a certain distance until the ball is touched.6 Further, the part of
the body that is used to shoot also affects the scoring probability. A shot made by foot is
generally faster and more precise than a header. Information on the rule setting and the
body part used for each shot is widely recorded and is thus typically used for modeling
scoring probabilities (e.g., Caley, 2015; IJtsma, 2015; Wright, Atkins, Polman, Jones, &
Sargeson, 2011).
An additional factor that is expected to influence the scoring probability of a shot is
defensive pressure from the opposing team. If defensive pressure is high, for example,
when a defender is right in front of the shot taker or when the defender is already making
6 According to the rules of the game, goals can also be scored from direct corner kicks and from the kick-off. However,
these situations are very rare and are quite similar to free kicks in terms of the rule setting. Therefore, such shots could
also be treated as free kicks. By contrast, penalty kicks are a different category in terms of the rule setting because the
defending team is much more limited in their options. They are not allowed to position any defender within the penalty
box, and the goalkeeper must remain on the goal line until the penalty kick is taken.
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body contact with the shot taker, the scoring probability is expected to decrease. Several
earlier studies that analyzed video sequences were able to include variables that directly
capture defensive pressure. Ensum, Pollard, and Taylor (2004), for example, included the
number of outfield players between the shot taker and the goal, as well as a space variable
to indicate whether a defensive player is more than 1 meter from the shot taker.
However, this concrete information on the positioning of the defenders at the moment
of a shot is not yet systematically available in typical packages offered by professional
sport data companies. Thus, most existing models incorporate defensive pressure only
indirectly through proxy measures. Caley (2015) includes an indicator variable for shots
made after corner kicks because corner kicks are among the most defended actions in
football. Further, he includes a variable that indicates whether a shot follows a counter
attack, which is a proxy for less defensive pressure. Similarly, IJtsma (2015) includes the
game state to model defensive pressure because the defensive pressure of an opponent
is expected to increase if the opponent is already leading in the match (and vice versa).
Nevertheless, the upcoming availability of tracking data will allow defensive pressure to be
calculated more accurately, which will increase the predictive power of estimation models
(see e.g., Lucey et al., 2015).
From a more dynamic perspective, the motion sequence of the shot-taking action is
another factor that is expected to influence the scoring probability. For example, it matters
whether the ball is hit after a fluid run past some defenders or with a volley out of the air
after a cross. The motion of the player while shooting differs, which affects the difficulty
of the shot. However, such motion sequences are challenging to operationalize empirically
compared to the factors discussed above. One would need a video-based or sensor-based
scan of body movement, which is not yet available. Therefore, only proxy variables, such
as a shot assisted by a cross or a shot preceded by a dribble, are employed to partially
account for the motion sequence of the shot taker (see e.g., Caley, 2015; IJtsma, 2015).
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The individual finishing skill of the shot taker and the individual skill of the goalkeeper
to stop shots on target are two additional factors that are expected to influence the scoring
probability of a given shot. Different shot takers have different motor skills that influence
the speed and accuracy of the shot and thus the scoring probability. Furthermore, the
mental ability of the players, such as dealing with pressure, is also expected to have an
impact. Likewise, better goalkeeper skills, such as a short reaction time or an enhanced
ability to predict the behavior of the shot taker, decrease the scoring probability of a
shot. However, the shot taker’s finishing skills and the goalkeeper’s shot-stopping skills
are difficult to empirically quantify because there are usually insufficient shots observed
in the data samples to systematically differentiate between skills and random variations.7
Therefore, the most current available approaches neglect individual skills and model the
scoring probabilities of shots based on the average finishing skills of all shot takers and
the average shot-stopping skills of all goalkeepers.
All the factors described thus far are expected to be under the systematic control of
the players and teams on the pitch. However, a range of other, more idiosyncratic factors,
such as pitch conditions, the spin of the ball and wind, potentially influence the scoring
probability of a given shot. These factors are typically not under the systematic control
of the players, and their effect on the scoring probability remain mostly diffuse.
Although all these factors are expected to influence the scoring probability of a shot,
an effective empirical model should focus on factors that are under the systematic control
of the players. Specifically, the model should accurately account for the location of the
shot, the rule setting, the body part used, the defensive pressure, the motion sequence, the
player’s finishing skills and the goalkeeper’s skills. However, because some of these factors
are difficult to operationalize given the current data availability, only restricted models
are empirically feasible at the moment. Nevertheless, the theoretical interpretation of the
7 By nature, the small-sample issue is more problematic for shot takers than for goalkeepers (because goalkeepers face all
the shots from the opposing teams while individual players take only a fraction of the shots of a team) and is even more
problematic for defenders than for strikers (because defenders shoot less often than do strikers). Further arguments on
the small-sample issue for the identification of shot takers’ individual finishing skills can be found in Caley (2015).
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estimated scoring probability of a shot is straightforward: how much is a given shot worth
in terms of the likelihood that it will lead to a goal based on the specific situation at the
time of the shot.
3 Estimation of expected goals
3.1 Data and variables
Our data include shot information on all 7,304 matches played in the English Premier
League, the French Ligue 1, the German Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish
La Liga in the four seasons from 2013/2014 to 2016/2017.8 In total, we observe 170,688
shots that resulted in 19,283 goals.9 For each shot, we have detailed information on the
location, the rule setting and the part of the body that was used. In therms of location,
we know the exact coordinates of the shot on the football pitch. Following Pollard and
Reep (1997), we calculate the shot distance as the Euclidean distance between the shot
location and the midpoint between the two goalposts. Furthermore, we calculate the shot
angle as the angle between the shot location and the two goalposts, which mimics the
player’s view of the goal. Hence, the shot angle becomes larger the closer and the more
central the location is to the goal, and vice versa.10 To distinguish between the different
rule settings of shots, we create dummy variables for shots made from open play, free
kicks, and penalty kicks. For the part of the body, we create dummy variables for shots
made with the foot and shots from headers.11
Table 2 shows the summary statistics. On average, 11.3% of all shots result in a goal:
that is, on average, it takes roughly 9 shots to score one goal. This figure is broadly in line
8 The dataset is provided by the commercial data provider Gracenote, which has been a Nielsen company since 2017.
9 Additionally, 594 own goals were scored in these leagues during our sample period. However, own goals are not coded
as shots; therefore, they are excluded from the dataset. Moreover, including own goals in our analysis would bias our
estimates because they are, by definition, unintended.
10 Alternatively, Pollard et al. (2004) calculated the angle from a perpendicular line from the nearest goalpost. Following
this approach, our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
11 Shots from other body parts account for only 0.5% of all shots and are thus classified as headers. Classifying shots from
other body parts separately does not qualitatively change any of our results.
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with the results of Lucey et al. (2015) and Pollard et al. (2004), who report average goal
rates of 9.6% and 10%, respectively. The average shot distance for all shots taken is 18.60
meters and ranges from 0.60 to 91.10 meters. The average shot angle is 22.95 degrees,
the smallest shot angle is 0.10 degrees, and the largest angle is 170.70 degrees. A total of
93.7% of the shots stem from open play, 5% from free kicks and 1.2% from penalty kicks.
Shots struck with the foot account for 84.3% of all shots. The remaining 15.7% of the
shots are headers.
Table 2
Summary statistics for shots.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Goal 0.113 0.317 0 1
Location
Distance 18.60 7.43 0.60 91.10
Angle 22.95 12.81 0.10 170.70
Rule setting
Open play 0.938 0.243 0 1
Free kick 0.050 0.219 0 1
Penalty kick 0.012 0.110 0 1
Body part
Foot 0.843 0.364 0 1
Header 0.157 0.364 0 1
Notes: The number of observation is 170,688. The shot distance is measured in meters and the shot angle is measured in
degrees.
3.2 Empirical model and estimation
Following Pollard et al. (2004) and Wright et al. (2011), we employ a logistic regression
analysis to estimate the probability of a goal, which is our binary response variable.
Formally, our model takes the form
Ln
[
P (Goali = 1)
P (Goali = 0)
]
= β0 + β1 Distancei+β2 Anglei+β3 Free kicki
+ β4 Penalty kicki+β5 Header i+εi,
(1)
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where the subscript i denotes a shot. The base category for the rule setting is open play
and the base category for the body part is a shot made by foot.12
Table 3 shows the estimation results for Equation 1. For example, the coefficient for
the shot distance is -0.1307, indicating that for every meter from the goal, the odds of
scoring decrease by 12.3%.13 Furthermore, the odds of scoring increase for each additional
degree of the shot angle. Free kicks and penalty kicks have a higher scoring probability
than do ordinary shots from open play, whereas headers have a low scoring probability
compared to shots made with the foot.
Table 3
Estimation results from logistic regression.
Goal (0/1)
Intercept -0.696***
(0.065)
Distance -0.1307***
(0.003)
Angle 0.029***
(0.001)
Free kick 1.049***
(0.050)
Penalty kick 2.193***
(0.052)
Header -1.054***
(0.023)
Pseudo R2 0.191
N 170,688
Notes: Logit estimates for Equation 1 are displayed. The binary dependent variable indicates whether a goal resulted
from a shot (1) or not (0). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Based on these coefficients, we predict the scoring probability of each shot in our
sample. For example, an open-play long-range shot by foot from 30 meters with an angle
of 11 degrees has a predicted scoring probability of approximately 1%. By contrast, an
open-play shot by foot from 5 meters with an angle of 70 degrees has a predicted scoring
probability of 66%.14
To derive the number of expected goals in a match, we aggregate the estimated scoring
probabilities for all the shots taken by each team. To illustrate this process, Table 4 shows
12 Alternatively, the probabilities of free kicks and penalty kicks could be estimated in separate models to account for the
different relationships between the likelihood of scoring a goal and the distance and angle from the goal (see e.g., Caley,
2015). However. we refrain from this approach to keep our estimation as simple as possible.
13 The odds ratio is equal to e−0.1307 = 0.877.
14 Calculation: −0.696− 0.1307 ∗ 5 + 0.029 ∗ 70 = 0.681; e0.681 = 1.98; 1.98/(1 + 1.98) ∼ 66%.
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all the shots made during the match between Arsenal and Manchester United on May 7,
2017. For example, in the 65th minute of the game, Manchester United’s player Wayne
Rooney took a shot from a direct free kick 26.8 meters from the goal for which our model
predicts a scoring probability of approximately 6%. In total, the 8 shots made by Arsenal
add up to chances worth 0.97 goals, and the 12 shots made by Manchester United add
up to chances worth 0.90 goals. Thus, even though Manchester United had four more
shots than did Arsenal, both teams produced chances of almost equal value in the match.
Nevertheless, Arsenal won the game 2–0, as Granit Xhaka and Danny Welbeck scored
from their shots in the 54th and 57th minutes. Notably, the goal made by Xhaka resulted
from a long-range shot that was 32 meters from the goal, for which our model predicts a
scoring probability of approximately 1%. However, the shot was deflected from the back
of a Manchester United midfielder and luckily found its way over the goalkeeper into the
net.
Table 4
Example calculation of the scoring probabilities of all shots made during a match played between Arsenal and Manchester
United.
Minute Player name Distance Angle Rule setting Body part Scoring probability of the shot
Arsenal ManU
2 Wayne Rooney 14.3 24.1 Open play Header 0.05
5 Anthony Martial 12.8 19.7 Open play Foot 0.14
9 Aaron Ramsey 14.4 17.3 Open play Foot 0.11
25 Wayne Rooney 9.3 42.6 Open play Header 0.15
26 Danny Welbeck 10.7 32.6 Open play Foot 0.24
30 Danny Welbeck 12.5 27.9 Open play Foot 0.18
31 Alex Oxlade-C. 25.1 16 Open play Foot 0.03
32 Wayne Rooney 11.3 31.1 Open play Foot 0.22
54 Granit Xhaka 31.7 12.7 Open play Foot 0.01
57 Danny Welbeck 5.9 62.2 Open play Header 0.33
65 Wayne Rooney 26.8 13.2 Free kick Foot 0.06
66 Juan Mata 26.6 15.2 Open play Foot 0.02
68 Granit Xhaka 25.1 16.6 Open play Foot 0.03
74 Wayne Rooney 26.9 15.5 Open play Foot 0.02
78 Anthony Martial 29.3 14 Open play Foot 0.02
81 Wayne Rooney 28.9 14.3 Open play Foot 0.02
87 Alexis Sanchez 22.2 15.8 Open play Foot 0.04
89 Wayne Rooney 16 14 Open play Foot 0.08
91 Marcus Rashford 19.6 16.7 Open play Foot 0.06
92 Scott McTominay 20.4 18.9 Open play Foot 0.06
Sum of the scoring probabilities for each team 0.97 0.90
Notes: The table shows all shots and their estimated scoring probabilities from the match between Arsenal and Manchester
United played on May 7, 2017. The sum of all scoring probabilities from one team corresponds to the expected goals of the
respective team.
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Note that our estimated scoring probabilities indicate a comparable likelihood based
on the shot characteristics considered by our expected goal model, i.e., the location of
the shot, the rule setting of the shot and the body part used for the shot. The true
likelihood that a shot will become a goal can still deviate substantially from the estimated
likelihood in a particular case if the shot differs in a characteristic that is not considered
in this model. For example, if a shot is taken after dribbling past a goalkeeper, the
scoring probability will be underestimated in our model because we do not account for
the empty net situation. Nevertheless, the main objective of quantified scoring chances as
a performance evaluation tool is to make chances comparable in a systematic and objective
way, with full knowledge that the estimated and true scoring probability can deviate for
a particular chance.
4 Comparison of performance evaluation measures
To be useful for decision making inside football clubs, a performance evaluation measure
based on expected goals must contain more relevant information about a team’s true
performance on the pitch than do match outcomes. To this end, the consistency of the
measure is crucial because true performance on the pitch is what clubs want to develop
over time through a combination of squad quality, coach quality and execution quality of
strategies and tactics developed off the pitch. To capture such developments within the
course of a single season and from season to season in a consistent way, the influence of
random variation on any measure of performance must be low.
Expected goals consider all the scoring chances, whereas match outcomes are based
solely on the few actual goals. Thus, expected goals should be less prone to the randomness
associated with match outcomes because they are based on a much larger number of actions
that represent a team’s true performance on the pitch.15 However, the informativeness
of expected goals in terms of the true performance on the pitch will also be impaired if
15 In an average match in our sample, the number of goals is 2.7 and the number of shots is 23.4.
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some of the qualities of a team are not systematically captured by the model. Ultimately,
the problem comes down to an empirical question of whether one of the two effects is
dominating the other while capturing the true performance as accurately as possible.
To address this empirical question, we compare the informativeness of both perfor-
mance evaluation measures by testing how well they predict the sporting success a team
will have in the future. Specifically, we test how well the number of points won in previ-
ous matches and the difference between expected goals created and allowed in the same
matches predict the number of points won by a team in the following matches. In the first
step, for any given matchweek, for every team in our sample, we estimate a univariate
linear regression model in which the dependent variable is the number of points won in
the following ten matches, and the independent variable is either the number of points
won in the previous ten matches or the difference between the expected goals created and
allowed in the previous ten matches. In the analysis, we follow Caley (2015) and employ
a rolling perspective across seasons.16
Table 5
Estimation results from the ordinary least squares regression for ten matches.
Number of points won next ten matches
(1) (2)
Number of points won in previous ten matches 0.506***
(0.008)
Difference between expected goals created and allowed 0.546***
in previous ten matches (0.007)
R2 0.253 0.320
N 12,119 12,119
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
To evaluate the predictive accuracy of the two metrics, we use the goodness-of-fit
measure R2, which represents the percentage of the variance in future success (i.e., points
won) that is explained by each metric from past matches in our model. Column (1) of
Table 5 shows that the number of points won in the previous ten matches explains 25.3%
16 To ensure that all the information about the ten previous matches and the ten following matches is included, we cannot
consider the first ten matchweeks of the 2013/2014 season and the last nine matchweeks of the 2016/2017 season because
we lack data from the 2012/2013 and 2017/2018 seasons that are required to create the respective measures. Similarly,
we exclude the matchweeks at the beginning of a season for teams that were promoted during our sample period and the
matchweeks at the end of a season for teams that were relegated during our sample period because we lack data from the
2nd divisions.
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of the variation in the number of points won in the following ten matches. By contrast,
Column (2) of Table 5 shows that the difference between the expected goals created and
allowed in the previous ten matches explains 32.0% of the variation in the number of points
won in the following ten matches. These results indicate that expected goals contain more
relevant information about a team’s true performance on the pitch in recent matches.
In the second step, we run the linear regression 1,444 times for every combination from
1 to 38 previous matches and from 1 to 38 following matches to test whether the previous
finding is robust to using different numbers of past and future matches.17 Figure 1 displays
all resulting R2 values. The light gray shading indicates the R2 values from the regressions
on the number of points won, and the dark gray shading depicts the R2 values from the
regressions on the difference between the expected goals created and allowed. For every
combination of the number of previous matches and the number of following matches in
Figure 1, the R2 calculated using expected goals is higher than the R2 calculated using the
number of points. Thus, expected goals contain more information about true performance
on the pitch for any sequence of matches within the horizon of a full season.
These results show that the advantage of expected goals, achieved through successfully
filtering out the random components of actual goals, outweighs the disadvantage of a
potential informational loss related to team qualities that are not captured by our model.
This results is noteworthy since our estimation of shots’ scoring probabilities follows a
very basic model and accounts for only three of the factors outlined in Section 2. A more
comprehensive model that accounts for additional factors should cause the use of expected
goals from previous matches to have an even greater informational advantage over using
match outcomes from previous matches.
17 Because we must omit matchweeks depending on the numbers of previous matches and the number of following matches,
the number of observations varies for the 1,444 regressions. The lower bound is 5,812 matchweek-team observations in
the regression in which we use information from the past 38 matches to predict the success in the next 38 matches. The
upper bound is 14,477 matchweek-team observations in the regression, where we use information from only the last match
to predict the success in the next match.
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Figure 1
R2 values from the regressions of points won in following matches on performance in previous matches for different numbers
of previous and following matches. The dark and light gray shading represent the R2 values when the performance is
measured by the difference between expected goals created and allowed and by points won, respectively.
5 Overperformance and underperformance of expected
goals
In the previous section, we have shown the informational advantage of expected goals over
match outcomes from a full sample perspective. However, to interpret the information of
expected goals for a particular club, we must address differences between expected goals
and actual goals (i.e., match outcomes) from the perspective of an individual case. In
particular, substantial deviation in a team’s actual goals and expected goals over a given
time period could be due to either the randomness of actual goals or qualities of a team
that are not captured in the model. For example, a team that has the ability to create
scoring chances with a lower level of defensive pressure might score more actual goals in a
particular situation than do other teams. However, because our model does not account for
differences in defensive pressure, such a team will systematically overperform the expected
goal estimates. By contrast, a team with lower than average abilities to create chances that
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face less defensive pressure might systematically score fewer actual goals than expected.
While such an overperformance or underperformance is systematic, an overperformance or
underperformance due to randomness is unsustainable. To improve the decision making by
managing the randomness inherent to match outcomes, we are interested in only the latter
type. Thus, we must assess to what extent the overperformance or underperformance of
expected goals is systematic.
A precise separation of the influence of random forces and the influence of existing
qualities that are not considered in the expected goal estimates is hard to achieve be-
cause a team’s true underlying quality is not time-constant due to, for example, player
transfers or coach changes. Nevertheless, we can identify the teams with the highest and
lowest long-term overperformance and underperformance within the scope of our sample
to construct some feasible thresholds. In particular, we calculate the overperformance and
underperformance as the ratio between all actual goals scored (conceded) and all expected
goals created (allowed) of a team within the 152 matches played between the 2013/14 and
2016/17 seasons.18 The higher the offensive ratio, the more goals a team scored compared
to expected goals created and the higher the defensive ratio, the more actual goals a team
conceded compared to the expected goals allowed.
Panel A in Table 6 shows that Real Madrid, Napoli, Borussia Mönchengladbach and FC
Barcelona are the four teams with the highest offensive ratios. For example, Real Madrid
scored 24.2% more actual goals than expected during the four seasons in our sample. It
appears to be reasonable that these four teams, which are all known for exceptional offenses
in terms of either their individual star players and/or their coaches’ tactical execution19,
form an upper bound of systematic offensive overperformance. The teams with the lowest
offensive ratios are Crystal Palace, Sunderland, FC Nantes and West Bromwich Albion.
Those teams underperformed considerably, scoring approximately 10% fewer goals than
18 We exclude newly relegated or promoted teams and calculate the ratios only for teams that were consecutively in our
sample.
19 In two of the four seasons included in our sample, Borussia Mönchengladbach was coached by Lucien Favre, who is
especially known for an offensive style that outperforms expected goals (Raman, 2017). Similarly, Napoli has been
coached by Maurizio Sarri in two of the four seasons in our sample, a coach who also has a strong reputation for an
offensive tactical execution that outperforms expected goals (Kwiatkowski, 2018).
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expected, which could be explained by the fact that these teams are systematically below
average in some team qualities that are not fully considered in our model. Panel B in
Table 6 shows the teams with the best and worst defensive ratios. Juventus, Atlético
Madrid, FC Bayern München and Manchester United, teams that are known for their
exceptional defensive strength and their exceptional goalkeepers (i.e., Gianluigi Buffon,
Jan Oblak, Manuel Neuer and David de Gea), conceded between approximately 28% and
19% fewer goals than estimated by our model. By contrast, Werder Bremen, FC Lorient,
RCD Espanyol and Toulouse FC conceded approximately 20% more goals than expected.
If a team exhibits a ratio considerably above or below these thresholds during a shorter
evaluation period, it seems very unlikely that the ratio is systematically driven by underly-
ing qualities and much more likely that the difference is unsustainable due to randomness
in actual goals scored or goals conceded. Accordingly, the thresholds can provide insights
to the decision makers of clubs in order to evaluate situations in which actual goals and
expected goals diverge over a given sample of matches.20
To analyze how often teams temporarily perform above or below the long-term thresh-
olds presented in Table 6, we calculate the offensive and defensive ratios based on a short
sequence of five matches, i.e., matchweeks 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, and 31-35.
Table 7 displays the 25th percentile (Q1), the 50th percentile (Q2) and the 75th percentile
(Q3) of the ratio distribution for these sequences of five matchweeks. Because the values
of Q1 (Q3) are mostly smaller (larger) than the thresholds, in more than 25% of the ob-
servations a team scored temporarily below (above) the thresholds. Thus, unsustainable
overperformance or underperformance is observed very frequently if we look at sequences
of a small number of matches.21 To note a particular extreme case, FC Villarreal created
37 shots worth 4.3 expected goals and allowed 57 shots worth 7.2 expected goals to their
20 The thresholds should become narrower if more relevant factors are considered in the expected goal model. For example,
if we include the current score of the match at the moment of the shot in our model to proxy defensive pressure to some
extent (see asdf), the highest offensive ratio we observe for a team over the full sample period decreases from 1.242 to
1.206. Similarly, the lowest offensive ratio increases from 0.885 to 0.901).
21 Even if we extend the match sequences, the number of observations in which teams perform above or below the thresholds
remains considerable. For example, for a sequence of 10 matches, 21% (32%) are above (below) the offensive ratio and
14% (27%) are below (above) the defensive ratio.
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Table 6
Offensive and defensive over- and underperformance of expected goals.
Panel A: Offensive overperformance and underperformance
Team Expected goals created Actual goals scored Offensive ratio Ratio rank
Real Madrid 352.6 438 1.242 1
Napoli 262.6 321 1.223 2
Borussia Mönchengladbach 183.4 224 1.222 3
FC Barcelona 358.8 438 1.221 4
.
.
.
West Bromwich Albion 174.2 158 0.907 65
FC Nantes 158.9 142 0.894 66
Sunderland 167.3 149 0.891 67
Crystal Palace 191.0 169 0.885 68
Panel B: Defensive over- and underperformance
Team Expected goals allowed Actual goals conceded Defensive ratio Ratio rank
Juventus 130.2 94 0.722 1
Atlético Madrid 138.2 100 0.724 2
FC Bayern München 108.2 80 0.740 3
Manchester United 177.6 144 0.812 4
.
.
.
Toulouse FC 183.9 213 1.159 65
RCD Espanyol 187.6 226 1.204 66
FC Lorient 191.4 231 1.207 67
Werder Bremen 215.1 260 1.209 68
Notes: Offensive and defensive over- and underperformance is calculated for all 68 teams that were consecutively in the
sample between season 2013/14 and 2016/17 (152 matches). The ratios are calculated as actual goals divided by expected
goals. The table only displays the four highest- and lowest-ranked teams.
opponents between matchweeks 16 and 20 in the 2015/16 season. However, they scored 7
goals (offensive ratio of 1.63) and conceded only one goal (defensive ratio of 0.14) during
these five matches. Accordingly, even though that FC Villarreal was not very dangerous
in terms of chance creation or defensively very solid in terms of chance allowance, the
team gained an almost perfect 13 points out of the five matches based on the numbers of
actual goals scored and conceded due to their overperformance.
Table 7
Quartiles of offensive and defensive short-term ratios.
Overperformance and underperformance N Q1 Q2 Q3
Offensive ratio 2,672 0.760 1.002 1.289
Defensive ratio 2,672 0.758 1.003 1.293
Notes: The ratios are calculated as actual goals divided by expected goals over sequences of five matches. Q1, Q2, Q3
refer to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively.
20
Overall, there is a considerable number of situations for clubs in which the discrepancy
between actual goals and expected goals cannot be explained by systematic overperfor-
mance or underperformance. Rather, unsustainable overperformance or underperformance
due to randomness appears to be the driver of ratios that lie beyond the thresholds of sys-
tematic overperformance or underperformance. In the next section, we derive a simple tool
to identify critical situations in which randomness is likely to disguise true performance
on the pitch.
6 Expected goals and decision making
In situations where match outcomes indeed reflect the true performance on the pitch,
the potential for misjudgment is limited. However, in situations where match outcomes
are influenced by numerous random components and misrepresent the true performance
on the pitch over a series of matches, misjudgments can arise. One way to identify such
situations is to compare the ranking of a team in the official league table to a ranking based
on the difference between expected goals created and allowed by a team. As an example,
Table 8 shows the official league table and the ranking based on expected goals for the
English Premier League halfway through the 2016/17 season. At that time, Chelsea was
ranked first in the official league table with 49 points. By contrast, Manchester City had
the highest ranking based on expected goals, with generated chances worth 42.1 goals,
allowed chances worth 19.2 goals, and a positive difference of +22.8.
For 15 of the 20 teams, the rank difference is within three and is thus relatively small.
However, there are also teams that are substantially over- or under-rewarded in the official
league table. On one hand, Burnley ranks 11th in the official league table while ranking
20th, and thus last, based on expected goals. On the other hand, Leicester City ranks
15th in the official league table even though their performance based on expected goals
would rank them much better in the 9th position.
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Table 8
Assessment of team performance in the English Premier League halfway through the 2016/17 season.
Official league table Ranking based on expected goals
Rank Club Points Rank Club created allowed ∆
1 Chelsea 49 1 (+4) Manchester City 42.1 19.2 +22.8
2 Liverpool 43 2 (0) Liverpool 39.7 17.4 +22.3
3 Arsenal 40 3 (+1) Tottenham Hotspur 37.0 18.9 +18.2
4 Tottenham Hotspur 39 4 (+2) Manchester United 34.7 18.0 +16.7
5 Manchester City 39 5 (–4) Chelsea 32.6 16.5 +16.1
6 Manchester United 36 6 (–3) Arsenal 34.6 20.3 +14.3
7 Everton 27 7 (+2) Southampton 30.5 21.7 +8.7
8 West Bromwich A. 26 8 (–1) Everton 25.0 22.8 +2.2
9 Southampton 24 9 (+6) Leicester City 26.2 26.2 –0.1
10 Bournemouth 24 10 (+2) West Ham United 27.0 30.6 –3.6
11 Burnley 23 11 (–1) Bournemouth 24.9 28.6 –3.7
12 West Ham United 22 12 (–4) West Bromwich A. 20.7 25.4 –4.7
13 Watford 22 13 (+1) Stoke City 21.8 28.5 –6.7
14 Stoke City 21 14 (+3) Crystal Palace 26.2 33.2 –6.9
15 Leicester City 20 15 (–2) Watford 19.1 29.1 –10.0
16 Middlesbrough 18 16 (0) Middlesbrough 16.8 30.0 –13.2
17 Crystal Palace 16 17 (+3) Swansea City 25.3 40.2 –15.0
18 Sunderland 14 18 (0) Sunderland 21.0 37.6 –16.6
19 Hull City 13 19 (0) Hull City 18.6 38.9 –20.2
20 Swansea City 12 20 (–9) Burnley 17.2 38.0 –20.8
Notes: Both tables indicate the ranking of the teams after matchweek 19 (out of a total of 38 matchweeks). The brackets
in the rank column for the ranking based on expected goals refer to a team’s rank difference against the official league
table. ∆ indicates the difference between expected goals created and allowed.
To identify and illustrate situations with significant discrepancies based on the data
reported in Table 8 in a non-technical way, the graph in Figure 2 plots each team’s ranking
in the official league table on the y-axis and its ranking based on expected goals on the
x-axis. The identity line marks where a team would have the same ranking in both tables.
Teams located below the identity line have a better rank in the ranking based on expected
goals compared to the official league table and, vice versa.
A quick glance at Figure 2 clearly shows that Burnley is over-rewarded and Leicester
City is under-rewarded in the official league table halfway through the 2016/17 season.
In general, the further away from the identity line a team is located, the more likely it is
that randomness played an important role in the team’s results. The larger the difference
between the rankings of the two tables is, the more severe it is when decision makers
judge the performance of a team based only on the official league table. Thus, any outlier
should trigger an alert and make decision makers aware that the rank in the official league
table might be substantially driven by randomness. As we discussed in Section 5, it
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Figure 2
Rank in the official league table versus the ranking based on expected goals for the English Premier League teams halfway
through the 2016/17 season. The ranking based on expected goals sorts the teams by their difference between expected
goals created and allowed.
remains possible that some discrepancies are due to team quality characteristics that the
expected goal model does not account for. Nevertheless, any alert can be further examined
to judge whether there are legitimate reasons to conclude that the overperformance or
underperformance is systematic.
To investigate the discrepancies between the official league table and the ranking based
on expected goals from a broader perspective, we show all team observations in our sample
halfway through each season in Figure 3. Specifically, the figure plots the rankings based
on expected goals against the official league ranking for all 392 team-season rankings
after matchweek 19 of the English Premier League, the French Ligue 1, the Italian Serie
23
A and the Spanish La Liga and after matchweek 17 of the German Bundesliga for the
four seasons from 2013/14 to 2016/17. Because many of these team-season observations
overlap, the size of the bubbles represents the number of observations for a specific rank
combination. The largest bubble is located in the upper-right corner because the most
common combination is that a team is ranked 1st in both the official league table and
based on expected goals. This result appears to be reasonable because the ranking is
bounded at the 1st rank and the very dominant teams usually also perform very well in
terms of expected goals. Overall, the results show that, even though the majority of the
teams are located quite close to the identity line, large discrepancies of 7 or more ranks
occur for a substantial 11% of all cases at the halfway point of a season. These cases can
be found in the upper-left and the lower-right corners and are the situations most prone
to misjudgments.
In the following, we discuss three examples where teams were ranked much worse in
the official league table than their ranking calculated using their performance based on
expected goals, i.e., the lower-right corner in Figure 3. In other words, these cases include
teams that generally performed well in creating chances and in preventing opponents
from doing so but did not translate this accomplishment into positive match results and
a corresponding ranking in the league table. First, VfB Stuttgart were ranked 16th in
the official league table but a lofty 6th based on expected goals after the first half of
the 2015/16 season. Nevertheless, the club officials decided to dismiss the coach Alex
Zorniger after matchweek 13 (VfB Stuttgart, 2015). Second, the Italian Serie A club
Cagliari Calcio fired its coach Zdenek Zeman after matchweek 16 in the 2014/15 season,
when it was ranked 18th in the official league table (The Guardian, 2014). In the ranking
based on expected goals, however, Cagliari was ranked 6th which suggests a much better
underlying performance. Third, Real Betis dismissed Pepe Mel after matchweek 15 in the
2013/2014 season when they were placed last in the official league table, but they were in
a satisfactory 8th place in the ranking based on expected goals.
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Figure 3
Rank in the official league table versus the ranking based on expected goals for all teams in the English Premier League, the
French Ligue 1, the Italian Serie A, the Spanish La Liga and the German Bundesliga at the halfway point of each season
from 2013/14 to 2016/17. The ranking based on expected goals sorts the teams by the difference between expected goals
created and allowed.
All the clubs in these three examples took action after being on a disappointing rank
in the official league table, although their performance based on expected goals ranked
them at least ten ranks higher. Furthermore, the offensive and defensive ratios indicate
that their underperformance of expected goals was likely to be unsustainable. For exam-
ple, the offensive ratio of Real Betis calculated from the beginning of the season up to
the dismissal decision was 0.734 and the defensive ratio was 1.632, implying that they
scored approximately 27% less goals and conceded approximately 63% more goals than
expected based on the scoring chances they created and allowed.22 Thus, Real Betis was
22 The offensive (defensive) ratios for Cagliari were 0.830 (1.442) and for VfB Stuttgart 0.719 (1.304), respectively.
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substantially under-rewarded in terms of goals actually scored out of the chances they
created and in terms of goals they actually conceded out of the chances they allowed to
their opponents.
Unfortunately, non of these three clubs were able to significantly rebound in the official
league table after replacing their coaches, and all were relegated to the 2nd division at
the end of the season. Interestingly, not only were the teams not able to improve their
match outcomes and their rankings in the official league table, but their rankings based
on expected goals also declined during the rest of the season. This suggests that their true
performance on the pitch was worse under the new coach than it was under the coach who
was replaced. Although we do not know exactly what would have occurred if the old coach
had been allowed to continue, the discrepancy between the two table ranks at the moment
the decision makers took action and the subsequent development in the remainder of the
season provides suggestive evidence that replacing the coach sealed the team’s fate and
had costly consequences for the club.
For situations where teams are located in the upper-left corner of Figure 3, the per-
ception of a team’s true performance on the pitch might be overly optimistic, which can
also lead to misjudgments and flawed decision making. For example, Swansea City was
ranked 9th in the official league table halfway trough the Premier League 2014/15 season,
while being ranked only 19th based on expected goals. The defensive ratio of 0.718 upon
this point in time suggests that Swansea conceded approximately 28% fewer goals than
expected, a value that cannot be explained by systematic overperformance. The offen-
sive ratio of 1.157 was less pronounced but still indicates an offensive overperformance of
approximately 15%.
The discrepancy between the table ranks persisted until the end of the season when
Swansea finished 8th in the official league table – the highest finish in the club’s history
– while it was ranked 20th, and thus last based on expected goals. After the club-record
finish in the official league table, the decision makers at Swansea decided to give its
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young coach Garry Monk, who had taken over a few months before the beginning of the
2014/15 season, a contract extension until 2018, which was accompanied by a significant
salary increase (Talksport, 2015). At that point in time, the club’s chairman Huw Jenkins
described the contract extension as a “[...] deserved reward for the fantastic season we’ve
just had [...].” (BBC, 2015, para. 6).
However, the excitement about Garry Monk’s work in the 2014/15 season at Swansea
did not last long. Although Swansea had a good start in the first four matchweeks of the
2015/16 season, they dropped heavily between matchweeks 5 and 15. After this stretch of
ten matches with seven losses, two draws and only one win, Swansea was ranked 15th in
the official league table. At that point, Swansea took action again and dismissed Garry
Monk. Chairman Jenkins now stated, “To find ourselves in our current situation from
where we were in the first week of September, and considering the drop of performance
levels and run of results over the last three months, it has brought us to this unfortunate
decision today.” (The Guardian, 2015a, para. 4). This decision became much more costly
due to the extension of Monk’s contract until 2018 just a few months earlier.
In defense of the dismissal decision, and probably also in defense of the contract exten-
sion a few months earlier, Jenkins further argued that “[...] when you take into account
the excellent campaign we had last season when we broke all club records in the Pre-
mier League, nobody foresaw the position we would be in at this moment in time.” (The
Guardian, 2015a, para. 5). We respectfully disagree. Based on the ranking of expected
goals, warning signs were clearly evident at the moment Swansea made the decision to
extend the contract of Garry Monk. Swansea was ranked more than 10 ranks worse in
the ranking based on expected goals with an offensive overperformance of approximately
10% more goals scored than expected and a defensive overperformance of approximately
20% less goals conceded than expected. Given this weak performance of Swansea in terms
of chance creation and chance prevention during the 2014/15 season, it seemed foresee-
able that the team would likely not be able to come close to repeating the results they
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achieved in the previous season. Thus, we argue that the decision makers of Swansea did
not properly judge the team’s true performance on the pitch in the 2014/15 season based
on the official league table. Instead, they might have been misled by the overly positive
match outcomes and made a hasty and costly contract-extension decision for the club.
Overall, we suggest that expert decision makers inside clubs can make mistakes when
forming judgments and making decisions in situations in which random forces have highly
impacted the outcomes. The rank-comparison chart is a simple tool that can be used to
create a new awareness of situations that are sensitive to flawed judgment and decision
making. Considering the ever-increasing stakes of decisions made in European club foot-
ball, we expect clubs to show a growing need for such approaches that complement the
existing practice of outcome-based performance evaluation to improve the overall quality
of their decision making.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to the improvement of performance evaluation and decision
making in European club football in several ways. First, we introduce expected goals based
on quantified scoring chances as an alternative method to forming a judgment about team
performance in football. We provide evidence that expected goals are a superior source of
information to match outcomes by showing that the difference in a team’s expected goals
created and those allowed in previous matches is a better indicator of its subsequent results
than are the number of points the team won in those matches. Therefore, we propose that
considering expected goals will generally allow for a more objective assessment of a team’s
true performance on the pitch than would considering actual match outcomes. Indeed, our
analysis at the individual club level suggests that an overperformance or underperformance
of expected goals in the short-run is often due to randomness and thus unsustainable.
Second, we illustrate how this method, which is readily available, can be applied to
identify situations for which the decision makers of clubs are prone to make misjudgments.
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By plotting the teams’ rankings in the official league table against their rankings based
on expected goals, situations where a team’s results are much better or worse than their
expected goals would imply become instantly visible. Using this information, clubs’ deci-
sion makers should be able to avoid the fallacy of inferring poor performance from poor
match outcomes or inferring good performance from good match outcomes in situations
where this link is not present. The costs of applying such a method appear to be minimal
compared to the enormous costs of poor decision making. Thus, the method should also
be economically viable.
Third, we lay the groundwork for the development of a new mindset in professional
football clubs. Thus far, clubs have tended to underestimate the large role that random-
ness plays in football results. Instead, common practice is to consider match outcomes as
the most important indicator of a team’s true performance on the pitch and, ultimately,
for the quality of work of the club’s sporting personnel. We recommend that clubs begin
to incorporate more process-oriented and data-driven evaluation strategies into their de-
cision making processes. Certainly, a range of early-adapting clubs have already moved in
this direction at a fast pace (see e.g., The Guardian, 2015b; NY Times, 2017). However,
from an industry-wide perspective, this trend seems to remain in its infancy. Against
this background, the concept of expected goals as a complementary information source
for performance evaluation can be seen as a starting point for a new way of thinking in
boardrooms and on other levels of decision making in European football clubs.23
Our study is subject to at least two limitations. First, there might be more clubs
that already incorporate analytical, data-driven approaches into their decision making
processes than is currently known. In fact, it is reasonable to believe that some of the
progress inside the clubs remains hidden because clubs take care not to disclose their
23 One may ask why European club football has thus far been strongly resistant to such data-analytic approaches. One
reason is that detailed match data were long presented without context and meaningful analysis; therefore, clubs were
skeptical that anything useful could be learned (Walerius, 2017). As described by football writer Gabrielle Marcotti “I
think when ... data first became available there was a lot of what I consider bad data or meaningless decontextualized
data, like, you know, distance covered or passing percentage or possession percentage and I think a lot of the managers
looked at this and quite clearly, quite soon realized that this is kind of nonsense on its own.” (Walerius, 2017, para. 33).
Thus, the lack of prospects for the meaningful use of these data has driven clubs toward inaction (Anderson & Sally,
2014).
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specific approaches and treat this information as proprietary. However, the overall mindset
that can be inferred from the clubs’ actions and external representation does not make
a strong case for an alternative inner view. Second, the rankings based on expected
goals are calculated as the difference between expected goals created and expected goals
allowed by a team. This could bias the ranking if many of the expected goals that are
either created or allowed stem from just one or a few matches. Alternatively, we could
derive a team’s expected number of points based on the estimated scoring probabilities
of the shots via statistical simulation. The appealing element of this approach is that
every match receives the same weighting, which is comparable to the construction of the
official league table. However, a simulation of expected points is much more difficult to
grasp than the ranking based on expected goals because the latter ultimately translates a
football-intuitive question into numbers: How many chances did we create and how many
chances did we concede compared to our opponents?
In any case, the raison d’être of the idea presented in this paper is not that our
ranking based on expected goals should represent the true performance on the pitch in a
perfect way. Instead, the key message is that such a ranking based on expected goals can
act as a highly valuable warning system for decision makers to mitigate the tendency of
overlooking the influence of randomness in match outcomes and to improve judgment of
team performance.
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